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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
Defendant Wayne A. G. James appeals his conviction 
for wire fraud and embezzlement.  James challenges: (1) the 
introduction of evidence outside the statute of limitations; (2) 
the Government’s attempts to introduce evidence about 
James’s eviction lawsuit; (3) the use of a demonstrative aid; 
and (4) the substitution of an excused juror with an alternate 
after the jury had been polled.  Discerning no error, we will 
affirm.  
 
I 
 
A 
 
During the 2009 to 2010 term, James served as a senator 
in the Virgin Islands Legislature.  The Legislature maintained 
a fund that James and other senators could use to pay for 
Legislature-related expenses, such as the costs of running their 
offices, supplies, or for legislative initiatives.  Senators 
sometimes received checks from the fund for such items.  
James used a large portion of the checks issued to him for his 
personal expenses.    
 
James obtained these checks by presenting invoices 
purportedly associated with work on a historical project.  
Before becoming a senator, James took an interest in the 1878 
Fireburn, a revolt on St. Croix.  The Danish National Archives 
(“the Archives”) possesses historical documents about the 
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event.  In February 2008, James inquired about retrieving 
documents from the Archives and received a cost estimate.  For 
a fee, which had to be pre-paid by wire transfer, the Archives 
would gather and provide copies of documents to individuals 
outside of Denmark.  James hoped to use the records to 
eventually produce a movie. 
 
Over a year later, after James’s election to the 
Legislature, he requested funds for his Fireburn research 
project from the Legislature.  From April 2009 through mid-
October 2010, James obtained several checks by submitting 
false invoices for purported translation and research work for 
the Fireburn project.  Only a fraction of the funds James 
received were used to pay for the Danish records and 
translations.  James used most of the funds for his personal 
benefit, including for his re-election campaign.   
 
Law enforcement investigated this conduct and, on 
October 1, 2015, a grand jury returned an indictment charging 
James with two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343 and one count of federal program embezzlement in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A).   
 
B 
 
At trial, three evidentiary issues arose that are relevant 
to this appeal.  First, the District Court permitted the 
Government to introduce evidence of acts outside the 
limitations period, 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).  
 
Second, James moved to exclude evidence that he paid 
a court-ordered $18,000 bond in an eviction dispute with his 
landlord on the same day as he cashed one of the checks from 
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the Legislature.  The District Court did not rule on this motion 
before trial, but it instructed the Government not to discuss the 
eviction case in its opening.  Thereafter, the Government called 
two witnesses to testify about the eviction-related payment, 
Gerald Groner and Indira Chumney.  Groner was an attorney 
who had participated in the eviction litigation.  James objected 
to Groner’s testimony before any questioning took place.  The 
objection was sustained and Groner was excused.  Chumney 
was the branch operations manager for First Bank and was 
questioned about a bank statement and deposit slip reflecting 
James’s deposit of $18,000.  James objected before she 
testified about any other topic.  The objection was sustained 
and the witness was excused.  Although neither witness 
testified about the eviction case, James argued that the 
Government’s attempts to introduce evidence about it 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct and moved for a mistrial.  
The Court denied the motion.   
 
Third, the District Court permitted the use of a chart as 
a demonstrative aid to accompany the case agent’s testimony.  
The chart captured information from admitted exhibits, 
including dates of check requests, amounts requested and paid, 
and dates checks were cashed.  James objected to the 
Government’s effort to offer the chart into evidence under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006.  The Court took the objection 
under advisement.   The Court thereafter asked if James 
objected to use of the chart as a demonstrative aid and James 
replied “no objection.”  App. 676.  The Court thereafter 
instructed the jury that it should consider the chart as a guide 
for testimony, not as substantive evidence.  The Government 
used the chart during the case agent’s testimony to discuss the 
transactions,  but it was not admitted into evidence.  
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C 
 
When the jury determined they had completed their 
deliberations, the foreperson announced a guilty verdict.    
Before the District Court recorded the verdict, it polled the jury 
and perceived a problem with Juror 8.  After discussion with 
counsel, the Court questioned Juror 8.  The questioning 
revealed Juror 8’s limited ability to speak and understand 
English.  The Court also noted concerns about Juror 8’s candor 
and memory, and then it excused Juror 8.  James consented to 
the Court’s decision to excuse Juror 8, but he objected to 
replacing the excused juror with an alternate.  Despite James’s 
objection, the Court replaced the excused juror with an 
alternate. The Court then instructed the jury: (1) to “restart” its 
deliberations “as though you are starting from scratch,” App. 
913-14; (2) “there is no rush to reach a verdict;” App. 914; (3) 
the verdict “must be considered and deliberate;” id.; and (4) the 
new juror “should feel as though he is beginning anew, not . . . 
interposing or becoming someone who is interrupting an 
ongoing process,” id.  The reconstituted jury retired to 
deliberate anew and eventually announced a unanimous guilty 
verdict.    
 
James appeals.  
 
II1 
 
James challenges: (1) the introduction of evidence 
outside the statute of limitations; (2) the Government’s 
attempts to introduce evidence of the payment in the eviction 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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lawsuit; (3) the use of the chart during the case agent’s 
testimony; and (4) the substitution of an excused juror with an 
alternate after jury polling.  We address each claim in turn.  
 
A2 
 
James argues that the District Court erred in permitting 
the Government to introduce evidence of acts falling outside 
the statute of limitations.  18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).  “The general 
statute of limitations is five years after the offense is 
committed.”  United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 195 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)).  Because the 
Indictment was filed in October 2015, James argues that 
evidence of conduct that occurred before October 2010 is 
inadmissible.   
 
To prove wire fraud, the Government must show that 
the defendant “willful[ly] participat[ed] in a scheme or artifice 
to defraud,” with intent to defraud, and used a wire to further 
that scheme.  United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 518 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  Wire fraud is not a continuing offense, United 
States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 705 (3d Cir. 2011), but each 
wire may further a single, ongoing scheme to defraud, see 
Andrews, 681 F.3d at 518.  Thus, “mailings [and wirings] that 
fall outside the statute of limitations can be considered as 
evidence to prove [a] fraud that [occurred] within the statute of 
                                              
2 We review the District Court’s decision to allow or exclude 
evidence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Starnes, 583 
F.3d 196, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2009).  “We will not disturb a trial 
court’s exercise of discretion unless no reasonable person 
would adopt the district court’s view.”  Id. at 214 (alterations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).    
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limitations.”  United States v. Pharis, 298 F.3d 228, 234 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (en banc), as amended (Sept. 30, 2002); see United 
States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 806 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he 
wire fraud and mail fraud statutes differ only in form, not in 
substance[.]”). 
 
Because the jury may consider evidence outside the 
limitations period that proves the existence of an artifice to 
defraud, Pharis, 298 F.3d at 234, the District Court properly 
permitted evidence predating October 2010.  Such evidence, 
including James’s submission of false invoices to the 
Legislature to obtain funds for his own use, proved “the 
existence of [his] overarching scheme to defraud, [which] is an 
essential element of the wire fraud offenses.”  App. 101-02.  
More specifically, the Government introduced evidence of 
fake invoices and check requests from 2009 and early 2010, 
together with the fraudulent, non-time-barred October 2010 
invoices, to show that James had an ongoing scheme to use the 
Fireburn research as cover to obtain Virgin Island funds for his 
personal use.  The fact that James’s scheme began before 
October 2010 does not make evidence about his scheme from 
that period inadmissible, as it is relevant to prove an element 
of a non-time-barred crime: the existence of a scheme to 
defraud.  Pharis, 298 F.3d at 234; see also Fitzgerald v. 
Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 365 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A statute of 
limitations does not operate to bar the introduction of evidence 
that predates the commencement of the limitations period but 
that is relevant to events during the period.”).  Thus, the Court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of activities 
that occurred outside the statute of limitations.3  
                                              
3 Because evidence of James’s activity that occurred outside 
the statute of limitations was offered to prove the charged 
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B4 
 
James also argues that the District Court erred in 
refusing to grant a mistrial motion based on alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct.  According to James, the 
Government attempted to introduce evidence of an eviction 
matter that the Court had precluded.   
 
A prosecutor’s comments constitute reversible error 
only if they result in the denial of due process.  See United 
States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230, 259 (3d Cir. 2017); United 
States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 194 (3d Cir. 2010).  “The 
Government may run afoul of the defendant’s due process right 
to a fair trial by systematically injecting inadmissible . . . 
evidence at trial, thereby permeat[ing] the proceedings with 
prejudice.”  United States v. Welshans, 892 F.3d 566, 574 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
We do not “lightly overturn[]” a conviction based on 
prosecutorial misconduct.  United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 
11 (1985).  The “conduct must be viewed in context,” and 
                                              
scheme to defraud, it was not Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
“other acts” evidence, so any objection on that basis is inapt.  
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (“This 
gives effect to Rule 404(b)’s applicability only to evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts.  If uncharged misconduct 
directly proves the charged offense, it is not evidence of some 
‘other’ crime.” (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
4 We review the District Court’s ruling on a mistrial motion for 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 
176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  
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“only by doing so can it be determined whether the 
prosecutor’s conduct affected the fairness of the trial.”  Id. 
 
The Government’s efforts to introduce evidence from 
an eviction lawsuit against James did not deprive him of due 
process.  The District Court repeatedly expressed to the 
Government not to introduce evidence about the eviction case.5  
The Government nevertheless called two witnesses to testify to 
facts related to that case to show James’s “motive to steal 
taxpayer money.” App. 66, 115.  James, however, suffered no 
prejudice because the Court prevented the witnesses from 
giving any testimony about the eviction case.  The first witness 
the Government called to testify about this subject, Gerald 
Groner, was not permitted to testify about any subject.  He took 
the stand and, following a discussion between the Court and 
counsel, was excused.  When the second witness, Indira 
Chumney, was summoned to discuss the eviction-related 
payment, the Court repeated: “We are not going there.” App 
611.  Ms. Chumney testified about a bank statement reflecting 
James’s $18,000 deposit, but was excused before the 
documentation was admitted and before presenting any other 
testimony, including testimony about what happened to the 
                                              
5 The District Court made no pre-trial ruling, but it asked the 
Government not to address the eviction lawsuit in its opening.  
At the same time, the Court reserved whether the Government 
could mention the evidence later in the trial.  At the end of the 
first day of trial, the District Court expressed Rule 403 
concerns regarding the eviction lawsuit, but once again, it 
made no ruling on the record.  The Court re-expressed those 
concerns the next morning.  Although the Court did not provide 
explicit ruling, its desire that the Government avoid 
mentioning the eviction lawsuit was clear.  
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funds.  As a result, the Government’s efforts regarding the 
eviction lawsuit did not result in the introduction of 
inadmissible evidence.  James suffered no prejudice and thus 
there was no misconduct that requires us to disturb the verdict.  
Accordingly, the Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to grant a mistrial.  
 
C 
 
We next address James’s argument that the District 
Court erred in permitting the use of a chart summarizing the 
evidence of his funding requests.  James asserts that the chart 
was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006.  The 
problem with James’s argument is two-fold.  First, the chart 
was not admitted into evidence under Rule 1006.  Rather, it 
was used as a demonstrative aid.6  Second, when James was 
                                              
6 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 611, a district court has the 
discretion to determine the manner and method of testimony 
during trial.  “[T]he use of demonstrative evidence,” such as 
charts, with proper limiting instructions, is one means to 
control testimony, United States v. Velasquez, 304 F.3d 237, 
240 (3d Cir. 2002), and allows the court to “avoid [the] 
needless consumption of time,” Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) & 
advisory committee’s note; see also Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 
50 F.3d 1204, 1217 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Possick, 
849 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 1988) (use of demonstrative charts 
“to aid the jury’s comprehension is well within the court’s 
discretion”); United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 776 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (permitting use of chart summarizing assets, 
liabilities and expenditures in a tax case under Rule 611(a) 
because it contributed to clarity of presentation to jury and was 
reasonable method of presenting evidence). 
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asked if he objected to the use of the chart as a demonstrative 
aid, he replied “no objection.”  App. 676.  His response reflects 
“the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right,” in this case, to lodge an objection to a piece of evidence, 
and thus constitutes a waiver.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 733 (1993).   
 
When a right or rule is waived, “an appeal based on a 
non-adherence to the legal principle is precluded.”  Virgin 
Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2005).7  The rule 
that federal courts do not consider waived arguments is 
premised on the adversarial nature of our system of justice: that 
litigants, not the courts, choose the facts and arguments to 
present.  Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244 (2008); 
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 413 (2000) (observing 
that the principle of party presentation [is] basic to our system 
of justice).  Thus, when a party clearly chooses a particular 
path, it will be respected and generally not further reviewed.  
Not only does this approach respect the adversarial system, in 
which the parties choose their arguments, but it also promotes 
finality.  It encourages parties to present all relevant arguments 
to the trial court and binds them to their strategic choices.  See 
                                              
7 A right may also be forfeited.  A forfeiture occurs when a 
party fails to make a timely assertion of the right.  Olano, 503 
U.S. at 733.  If the right was forfeited, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b) provides a basis for review.  Rosa, 399 F.3d 
at 290.  Thus, if the defendant did not waive, the alleged error 
may be reviewed for “plain error,” despite the absence of a 
timely objection.  Olano, 503 U.S. at 733-34.  In short, “where 
there was forfeiture, we apply plain error analysis; where there 
was waiver, we do not.”  Rosa, 399 F.3d at 290-91 (quoting 
United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 807 (1st Cir. 1996)).   
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Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 
877 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Fleishman v. Cont’l 
Cas. Co., 695 F.3d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 2012)).  In addition, such 
preservation rules protect litigants from unfair surprise.  Id. 
(citing Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d 
Cir. 2009)); Holly Hill Farm Corp. v. United States, 447 F.3d 
258, 267 (4th Cir. 2006).  Finally, the rules promote judicial 
efficiency and prevent disturbing rulings based on grounds 
never argued to the district court.  Caisson Corp. v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 622 F.2d 672, 680 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Wood v. 
Milyard, 566 U.S. 463, 473 (2012) (reminding appellate courts 
“not to overlook” the “process and time investment” of the trial 
courts.).  
 
To advance these goals, when a party has intentionally 
relinquished a right, he or she may not seek review of any 
alleged error flowing from such a waiver “absent exceptional 
circumstances.”  United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d 175, 179 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Put differently, the claimed error “is not 
susceptible to review.”  Id.; see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 
(“mere forfeiture, as opposed of waiver, does not extinguish an 
‘error’ under Rule 52(b)”).  In short, when there is a waiver, 
we conduct no further analysis of the claimed error.  Rosa, 399 
F.3d at 290-91.  Because James affirmatively stated that he had 
no objection to the chart’s use in this fashion, he has waived 
any basis to seek review of that ruling.8 
                                              
8 Because the District Court allowed the chart only as a 
demonstrative aid and did not admit it into evidence under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, we need not address James’s 
argument that the chart was an improper summary under Rule 
1006.   
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James also argued that the case agent who testified 
using the demonstrative aid offered inadmissible opinion 
testimony.  James identifies no examples of this allegedly 
impermissible testimony.  As a result, he has waived this issue 
on appeal.  See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8) (to be preserved, 
the arguments must be supported specifically by “the reasons 
for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record 
on which the appellant relies”); Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 
296, 299 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005); John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA 
Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding 
that an argument is waived when raised only “in passing (such 
as, in a footnote)” without “squarely argu[ing]” it); see also In 
re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 390 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(concluding that to preserve an issue, the party must “present 
substantive argument in support of [the] claim,” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  In any event, the absence of any 
examples is not surprising given that the witness provided no 
opinions, but rather testified about only what he saw in the 
documents he reviewed.   
James’s opening brief also mentions another chart, 
identified as Exhibit 30.  Exhibit 30 was not admitted into 
evidence or used as a demonstrative aid.  The opening brief 
also makes reference to impermissible use of a summary chart 
by a forensic accountant, but James makes only passing 
reference to it and does not develop this argument.  Such a 
passing reference does not preserve the issue for appeal.  
CIGNA Int’l, 119 F.3d at 1076 n.6. 
James failed to preserve another argument.  James’s 
reply brief mentions for the first time that the forensic 
accountant relied on information outside the statute of 
limitations.  “[W]here an issue is raised for the first time in a 
reply brief, we deem it insufficiently preserved for review 
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D9 
 
James argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it declined to declare a mistrial after the jury 
poll revealed that a juror lacked the capacity to deliberate and 
when it substituted a juror with an alternate.   
 
                                              
before this [C]ourt.” Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 
284-85 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); In re Surrick, 338 
F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003); Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 
F.2d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Therefore, James failed to 
preserve any argument about time-barred material underlying 
the forensic accountant’s testimony.  Even if preserved, 
evidence of activity that predates the statute of limitations is 
relevant to proving the existence of the scheme to defraud, 
Pharis, 298 F.3d at 234, and, therefore, the accountant’s 
testimony was proper.   
9  “[A] trial judge is in the best position to weigh the 
circumstances peculiar to each trial.”  United States v. Fiorilla, 
850 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1988).  As a result, “we review the 
district court’s order denying a mistrial,” id. at 174, and its 
decisions regarding jury polling and dismissing a juror for 
cause for abuse of discretion.  See e.g., United States v. Fattah, 
914 F.3d 112, 149-151 (3d Cir. 2019) (“We review the 
dismissal of a juror for cause for abuse of discretion . . . .We 
will reverse only if the decision to dismiss a juror was without 
factual support, or for a legally irrelevant reason.” (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted)); United States v. 
Wrensford, 866 F.3d 76, 89 (3d Cir. 2017) (“We review a 
district court’s actions concerning jury polling for abuse of 
discretion” (citing Virgin Islands v. Hercules, 875 F.2d 414, 
417 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
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“[D]ecisions related to juror substitution are within the 
discretion of the trial court.”  United States v. Penn, 870 F.3d 
164, 171 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 700 (2018).  
District courts have “wide latitude in making the kind of 
credibility determinations underlying the removal of a juror,”  
United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1993), 
because their “unique perspective at the scene . . . [places them] 
in a far superior position” to determine the proper course of 
action when issues of juror disqualification arise, United States 
v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “currently . . . 
provide courts three options after excusing a juror for good 
cause during deliberations: (1) declare a mistrial; (2) proceed 
with [eleven] jurors; or (3) seat an alternate.”  United States v. 
Brown, 784 F.3d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 2015).  These three 
options come from three rules: Rule 31, Rule 23, and Rule 24.10  
Rule 31(d) gives the defendant the right (and the district court 
the option) to poll the jury after it returns a verdict.  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 31(d).  The purpose of jury polling is to provide “each 
juror an opportunity, before the verdict is recorded, to declare 
in open court his assent to the verdict which the foreman has 
returned and thus to enable the court and the parties to ascertain 
with certainty that a unanimous verdict has in fact been reached 
and that no juror has been coerced or induced to agree to a 
verdict to which he has not fully assented.”  Hercules, 875 F.2d 
at 418 (citations and emphasis omitted).  Where the poll 
demonstrates a lack of unanimity, Rule 31(d) leaves to the 
district court’s discretion whether the jury should be directed 
to redeliberate or whether a mistrial is warranted.  Fed. R. 
                                              
10 We address the rules in the sequence in which the events 
each rule addresses arose before the District Court.  
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Crim. P. 31(d).  Rule 23(b)(3) permits the court, at its 
discretion, to excuse a juror for good cause and allow a jury of 
eleven to return a verdict.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3).  Finally, 
under Rule 24(c), the court may replace a juror with an 
alternate where juror misconduct or incapacity arises, in which 
case the court must instruct the jury to begin anew with the 
alternate’s addition.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c).  Here, the Court 
polled the jury, identified good cause to excuse a juror, and 
excused the juror under Rule 23.  The Court then replaced the 
juror with an alternate and gave instructions for the jury to 
begin deliberation anew consistent with Rule 24.  
 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
choosing to seat an alternate and in denying James’s request 
for a mistrial.  Before the Court accepted the verdict,11 it polled 
                                              
11 A verdict is not final until is accepted by the Court.  See, e.g., 
Hercules, 875 F.2d at 417 (“[A] jury cannot be said to have 
reached a valid verdict until the result is announced in open 
court and no dissent is registered by any juror.”); see also 
Harrison v. Gillespie, 640 F.3d 888, 899 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“Because of the significance of the entire deliberative process, 
the jurors’ preliminary votes in the jury room do not constitute 
a final verdict, even if they are unanimous . . . . Instead, 
the verdict must be rendered by the jury in open court 
and accepted by the court in order to become final.  The court 
may also reject the jury’s verdict if it is inconsistent or 
ambiguous.”); United States v. Chinchic, 655 F.2d 547, 550 
(4th Cir. 1981) (“[A]ny member of [the jury] is entitled to 
change his or her mind up until the time of the trial court’s 
acceptance of the verdict.”); United States v. Love, 597 F.2d 
81, 84 (6th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he very existence of Rule 
31(d) which provides for polling a jury after its verdict has 
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the jury and perceived a problem with Juror 8.  The parties 
consented to further questioning of the juror after some debate.  
As a result of its observations and inquiry, the Court had 
concerns about the juror’s candor, memory, and English 
language proficiency, which reflected that it questioned 
whether Juror 8 understood the verdict as read by the 
foreperson.  Faced with these concerns about the juror, the 
Court acted within its discretion to excuse Juror 8.12    
 
James consented to the Court’s decision to excuse Juror 
8, but he objected to replacing the excused juror with an 
alternate.  The Court replaced the excused juror with an 
alternate, over James’s objection.  The Court told the jury to 
“restart” its deliberations, reminded the jury that “there is no 
rush to reach a verdict,” and that the verdict “must be 
considered and deliberate.”  App. 913-14.  The Court also 
instructed that the new juror “should feel as though he is 
beginning anew, not . . . interposing or becoming someone who 
is interrupting an ongoing process.”  App. 914.  The Court’s 
decisions to excuse Juror 8, replace her with an alternate, and 
give instructions to the newly constituted jury all complied 
with Rules 23, 24, and 31 and were within its broad discretion.  
                                              
been returned but before it is recorded compels the conclusion 
that a verdict is not final when announced.”).  
12 During jury selection, the District Court instructed the venire 
that prospective jurors who answer “yes” to any voir dire 
question should raise their juror cards.  Those jurors who raised 
their cards were questioned further.  Because it seems that 
Juror 8 did not raise her card and was not subject to any 
individual questioning, there was no occasion during jury 
selection for the Court or the parties to learn of Juror 8’s 
language difficulties.    
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United States v. Wrensford, 866 F.3d 76, 89 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“Our Court has adopted a rule vesting discretion in the trial 
court because a trial judge is in the best position to weigh the 
circumstances peculiar to each trial.” (quoting United States v. 
Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))).   
 
Taking Rules 23, 24, and 31 together, the District Court 
has the discretion to select among three options under the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including seating an 
alternate and directing the jury to begin deliberations anew 
when it had good reason to think that a juror lacked the capacity 
to deliberate.  Moreover, there is nothing in the record to 
suggest the decision to seat an alternate prejudiced James in 
any way.  Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in replacing Juror 8 with an alternate and instructing the jury 
to begin again.13  
 
James also asserts that the juror substitution violated his 
Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury trial.  “[F]ederal courts 
have generally ruled that the substitution of a juror after 
deliberations have begun does not violate the United States 
Constitution, provided that defendants suffered no prejudice as 
a result.”  Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573, 1576 (3d Cir. 
1995), amended (Dec. 1, 1995).  Because all deliberating 
                                              
13 James also argues that the District Court should have 
interrogated two jurors whom Juror 8 identified as being 
Spanish-speakers like her.  The Court acted within its 
discretion to deny this request as there was no evidence to 
suggest these jurors had any language difficulties.  
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jurors heard all of the evidence and were properly instructed,14 
and there is nothing in the record suggesting that the 
deliberating jurors lacked impartiality or the competence to 
understand the evidence and the instructions, or that the 
excused juror tainted or otherwise impaired the reconstituted 
jury that delivered the verdict, the Court’s substitution of Juror 
8 with an alternate neither prejudiced James nor violated his 
Fifth Amendment due process right or Sixth Amendment right 
to an impartial jury.   
 
III 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
14 We presume that the jury follows their instructions.  
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).  
